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Abstract
This paper aims to investigate the dynamics of capital markets in emerging markets
in a period of financial integration. It takes the case of Brazil and South Korea, two
key emerging markets in the global economy, to assess the relationship between capital
flows and equity prices. This is analysed through Jan Toporowski’s theory of “capital
market inflation”, which explains the movements of equity prices in relation to the
inflows of funds into the capital market. The main argument put forward is that the
foreign capital inflows into the emerging equity markets have substantially concurred to
create the excess liquidity that gives rise to a process of capital market inflation. This
contributes both to extend Toporowski’s theory to the context of emerging financially
open countries, and to give a new perspective to the debates over financial globalisation
by proposing the theory of capital market inflation as a framework to understand the
mechanics of capital flows to emerging markets. The empirical evidence available from
Brazil and South Korea suggests that this is a consistent and instructive framework of
analysis.
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Introduction
The past decade has been characterised by the process of financial globalisation. The liberalisation
of international financial transactions has given rise to a surge of international capital flows and
external balance sheet positions. This reflects both the deepening of international financial relations
but also the integration of more countries into the global financial system. In fact, while financial
integration is more pronounced among core advanced economies, a group of countries, collectively
known as “emerging markets”, has become increasingly importantin the global financial markets.
Such processes have been subject of debate within academic and policy institutions, especially
the IMF. While, according to standard theroies, international capital movements should be funda-
mentally beneficial, events, such as the East-Asian crisis in the late 90’s, raised several questions
about their actual impacts. The global financial crisis that started in 2008 has made this debate
even more prominent, as arguably financial globalisation contributed to channel the crisis over the
world very quickly.
This paper will engage with such debates, focusing on the remarkable expansion of equity
markets in emerging markets following their opening to foreign investors, focusing on Brazil and
South Korea. These two countries are among the biggest recipients of capital inflows within the
emerging markets group. Moreover, before the 2008 global financial crisis, they did not have any
form of capital controls, which have given a degree of policy autonomy to other emerging markets
such as China and India. Their experience is therefore closely intertwined with the process of
financial globalisation. This paper draws upon the theoretical framework proposed by Toporowski
(2002), to evaluate whether the two countries have experienced “capital market inflation”. The link
with financial globalisation is provided by the consideration of whether international capital flows,
rather than domestic private and institutional investors as in the original version of Toporowski’s
theory, are drivers of price inflation in the capital markets.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section deals with the literature on financial
globalisation and its most recent developments. Finally it will deal with some recent developments
in the literature of financial globalisation, especially relating to the growing recognition of new
patterns of financial globalisation and how these aﬀect the impact of financial globalisation in
emerging markets. Particular reference will be given to the idea that equity flows can in many
case bring upward pressure to stock prices of emerging markets, and how these “valuation eﬀects”
2
can have a considerable on impact on international assets (Akyüz, 2011; Prasad, 2011; Obstfeld,
2010, 2012).
The second section discusses the link between the theory of capital market inflation and financial
globalisation. The central idea is that international investors can induce, in emerging markets,
the same process of inflation typical of the “core” financial markets dominated by institutional
investors. Foreign investors thus seeks capital gains from emerging markets stocks, creating the
conditions of excess liquidity in the capital market that are necessary to inflate it. This makes the
dynamics of emerging capital markets dependent more on global financial conditions, rather than
“fundamentals”. In fact the collapse in stock prices of emerging markets in 2008 was the result
of capital outflows following financial turmoil in advanced countries (chiefly the U.S.) rather than
problems in emerging markets. Similarly, there are risks associated
The third section will deal with the empirical evidence of Brazil and South Korea. Their fast
and comprehensive financial integration into the global financial markets, along with no or little
restriction on such integration, plus their considerable size both financially and economically justify
the choice of these two countries as “cases”. This section considers whether the experience of Brazil
and South Korea is in line with the “new trends” of financial globalisation: capital flows size and
composition. Diﬀerences among the countries’ experiences will also be pointed out.
The fourth section will assess if the empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of cap-
ital market inflation. Data regarding capital flows and equity prices will be considered, especially
in relation to the impact of foreign investors and their behavior.
The final section concludes.
The originality of this paper lies in the connection between the literature on “financial global-
isation” to the “theory of capital market inflation”. This contributes on the one hand a new way
of understanding financial globalisation, as driven by the international capital investors, that are
seeking capital gain returns rather than investing long term in emerging market securities. On the
other hand it contributes to the development of the “theory of capital market inflation”, extending
it to the case of emerging markets from a more international perspective.
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1 Financial globalisation: stylised facts and debates
International financial integration has considerably expanded over the past twenty years. Between
1980 and 2010 global assets have increased from little more than 1 thousand billion to almost 44
thousands USD billions (Figure 1). Importantly, this figure almost tripled since 2002, suggesting
that financial globalisation has increased its pace in the most recent years. This increase is mostly
driven by advanced countries, with their international position eﬀectively accounting for the overall
expansion till 1999. However, since the beginning of the 2000’s, emerging markets have increased
their importance in ownership of global asset and liabilities position.
Flows data show a similar picture. Cross-border flows have increased overtime from 517 billion
in 1980 to over 12.700 billion of USD in 2007. Again, the major part of it occurred in the five years
between 2002 and 2007 (Figure 2). While all types of flows increased over this period, the most
important increase can be found in portfolio and “other” flows (mainly banking flows). This seems
to suggest that financial globalisation in recent years has been mainly driven by purely financial
transaction, with no direct relation to real economic activities.
In the post 2000 period emerging markets have also become increasingly integrated, but the
characteristics of their integration appear to be diﬀerent from the global trends. As fig. 3 shows, in
emerging markets it is mainly FDI and portfolio equity flows that expanded over time. After 2000,
debt liabilities remained roughly constant, showing the decreasing reliance of emerging markets
on international banking credit, previously the only relevant flows for the group as a whole. Debt
flows restarted growing significantly after the crisis.
From a neoclassical perspective, the increasing integration of financial markets, especially for
emerging markets, should be regarded positively for two basic theoretical reasons. The first is
better resource allocation. Capital, as any other factor of production, if allowed to move freely,
will flow to where it is relatively scarcer. In this way the international movement of capital
removes the constraint on investment given by national savings in a closed economy. With the
removal of capital flows restrictions, developing capital-scarce countries can borrow internationally
to finance their investments, thereby generating economic growth. The second reason is related to
diversification and consumption smoothing. The access to international capital markets will allow
countries to be less aﬀected by country specific shocks, as they can diversify their portfolio and/or
borrow in times of diﬃculty. This will contribute to reduce sharp shifts in consumption, and the
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resulting economic turbulences.
However, the series of financial crises that aﬀected several key emerging markets in the late
90’s and early 2000’s raised many concerns among economists. As Stiglitz (2000, p. 1075) as-
serted, “it has become increasingly clear that financial and capital market liberalization - done
hurriedly, without first putting into place an eﬀective regulatory framework - was at the core of
the problem”. Moreover, the characteristics of financial globalisation pose further challenges to
conventional theories. Firstly, capital, in net terms, has flown from emerging to advanced coun-
tries, in direct contradiction to neoclassical predictions (Prasad et al., 2007), and additionally, the
empirical evidence shows that capital seem to flow to countries with smaller growth and investment
(Gourinchas & Jeanne, 2007). This relates to another big issue, known in international financial
economics as “global imbalances” (Blanchard & Milesi-Ferretti, 2009; Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ, 2010),
that is the growing current account unbalanced positions, with the US being in structural deficit
and emerging markets as a whole and in China in particular having constant surpluses. Secondly,
as Prasad et al. (2004) show in a comprehensive, vastly quoted, review of the empirical literature,
there is in fact little evidence that financial globalisation positively aﬀected growth and volatility.
Nevertheless, the consensus that emerged before the crisis still regarded financial globalisation
as essentially good. Kose et al. (2006) argue that despite, the lack of evidence of its direct benefits,
financial globalisation is still beneficial through indirect channels. Capital flows contribute to
financial market development and promote an array of institutional improvements, such as better
corporate governance and macroeconomic policy disciplining. This is linked to the broader concept
of “financial development” (King & Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997), which is allegedly fostered by
financial globalisation. This argument is also shared by Mishkin (2007, p. 287):
“Financial globalization can play an important role in encouraging development
of institutions so that financial markets can eﬀectively perform the crucial function
of getting capital to its most productive uses which is key to generating growth and
reducing poverty”.
Additionally, it is argued (Kose et al., 2006, p23) that “flows that have equity-like features—i.e.,
FDI and portfolio equity flows—are not only presumed to be more stable and less prone to reversals
but are also believed to bring with them many of the indirect benefits of financial globalization such
as transfers of managerial and technological expertise” and therefore the changing composition of
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capital flows to emerging market should be seen as a positive development: a paper by the IMF
research department (Mauro et al., 2008, p. 4) considers the fact that “foreign direct investment and
other non-debt forms of international asset trade constitute a higher share of external financing
today than in recent decades” suggest that “the impact of financial globalization may be more
beneficial in coming years”. Such an argument has remained almost unaﬀected by the crisis. As
the main patterns of capital flows have remained unchanged after a temporary stop in late 2008,
Prasad (2011, p. 29) argued that “financial globalization seems to proceeding along the right track”
for emerging markets, as their liabilities are now “in forms that promote international risk sharing
and make them less vulnerable to sudden shifts in sentiment”.
There is however growing recognition that the new structure of financial globalisation may
create new types of problems. Prasad (2011, pp. 24-25) acknowledges that these new composition
of capital inflows may cause asset prices inflation and upward pressure on the exchange rate.
The rethinking within the IMF about the feasibility of capital controls in certain situations has
been precisely motivated by growing concerns of several emerging markets economies about the
resurgence of capital flows (Ostry et al., 2010).
Obstfeld (2010, 2012) latest papers also underline the importance of price changes on interna-
tional assets and liabilities. He argues that asset price inflation and deflation in emerging markets,
along with exchange rate movements, have had important eﬀects on the total value of assets held
by US investors. Similarly, Levy-Yeyati & Williams (2011) suggest that asset price inflation goes
a long way explaining the increase in foreign liabilities of emerging markets, and thus the claims of
their increasing financial integration are vastly overstated: the increase of foreign investors’ claims
on emerging market equities is mainly due to stock market booms rather than actual financial
integration.
From a more critical point of view, Akyüz (2011) points out that the recent boom of capital flows
to emerging markets economies has changed the nature of the problems caused by financial glob-
alisation. In several countries domestic financial markets are now dominated by foreign investors:
while this has turned foreign liabilities to mostly local currency denominated securities and thus
reduced the scope of potentially troublesome currency mismatches, it will make their dynamics
dependent on financial and economic conditions abroad, independently from the national “funda-
mentals”. Thereby, “tightened credit conditions in AEs can lead to a rapid withdrawal by highly
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leveraged investors from DEEs, causing asset and currency declines, as observed after the collapse
of Lehman Brothers” (p. 23). Such views are of course generally shared by recent developments
in the “financialisation literature” (Lapavitsas, 2009; Kaltenbrunner & Painceira, 2009).
In conclusion, after a decade when the issue was not “whether financial globalization is in-
herently good or bad, but whether it can be done right” Mishkin (2007), there is now a general
agreement that financial flows to emerging markets and developing countries, despite creating less
external exposures than in the past due to their changed composition, may have adverse conse-
quences to the functioning of financial markets. Equity market in particular may experience asset
price booms as a result of inflows.
2 Capital market inflation and financial globalisation
The theory of capital market inflation was theorised by Toporowski (2002) and subsequently devel-
oped in later works (Toporowski, 1999, 2008, 2009, 2010). The analysis starts by considering the
relation between corporate finance and the equity markets. Companies, it is argued, do not issue
equity to finance new investments, because the instability of capital markets and the uncertainty
of returns on productive capital investment make equity unstable as a form of stable financing of
companies’ activities. In fact, companies finance their fixed capital investments mostly through
their liquid reserves, a concept that shows the influence of Kaleckian monetary economics on
Toporowski’s work. Financing on the capital markets is thus aimed at replenishing liquid reserves
assets that are generally used to finance productive capital. Therefore “the book value of the stocks
and shares of companies is more or less equal to the book value of the underlying fixed capital
assets of those companies” (p. 26).
The actual capital market value, however, can diﬀer significantly from the book value. This
is because, there is no a priori mechanism for which the refinancing needs of firms will exactly
match the supply of equity capital by investors:
“In practice, the supply of finance is determined by income, the institutional ar-
rangements aﬀecting household saving, the financial accumulation of companies and
transfers between the capital market and the other vehicles for long-term savings ...
the demand for finance is determined, in the case of companies, by the size and na-
7
ture of their business and its circumstances, as well as the cost and convenience of
alternative financing arrangements”
This means that capital markets will rarely be in equilibrium. Whenever the demand for equities
is higher than the issuance of new equities plus the sum of equities other investors are prepared to
sell, a net excess inflow of funds will circulate into the capital markets. This is, according to the
theory, the source of inflation in the capital markets: this net excess inflows is traded within the
capital market by financial intermediaries, inflating the price of securities. This process lasts “until
eﬀective prices reach a level that elicits the issue of suﬃcient new stock to take up the positive
net inflow, or until the positive inflow ceases” (p. 34). Once the demand for equities becomes
smaller than its supply and the cumulated excess inflows dry up, the rising illiquidity leads to
deflation. Companies, unable to refinance their investments on the capital markets, are forced
into debts, which in turn lead them to postpone investments, driving the economy into a recession
(Toporowski, 2010).
The theory of capital market inflation thus contends that the idea that stock prices act as a
clearing mechanism in the capital market and will thus bring supply and demand in equilibrium is
flawed, and in any case empirically not valid in the context of modern financial markets. “Capital
market inflation or deflation in fact adds to that price the ‘externality’ of a capital gain or loss”
Toporowski (2010, p. 8), so that the supply and demand for equities will not be determined
by the dividend yield - the value of the dividend with respect to the share price -, as generally
assumed by conventional theories such as the Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis, but will be increasingly
related to the inflation or deflation of the capital market. Moreover, the theory of capital market
inflation goes beyond the conventional idea of “rational bubbles”, where investors are fully aware
of the deviation from “fundamentals”, but rationally buy shares in expectation of capital gains,
hoping to sell them before the burst (Brunnermeier, 2009). Since net inflows drive equity prices,
fundamentals, as Evans (2001) argues, play no role in Toporowski’s theory, and therefore the price
deviation from them can be substantial and last for prolonged periods. A priori this cannot be
cause of a crisis, as long as the net excess inflows circulate in the markets and still exceed supply.
To the contrary, “stock markets crash not because they are out of equilibrium, but because their
disequilibrium has been insuﬃcient” (Toporowski, 2002).
The historical process, according to Toporowski (2002), that firstly originated the process
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of capital market inflation was the creation of funded pension schemes in the late 70’s. The
introduction of pension funds, especially in the US and the UK, created a huge and sudden inflow
of funds into the equity markets. This inflow was in excess of the refinancing needs of firms,
and thus, in accordance with the theory, pushed equity prices up. However, it is argued, such
inflows of funds cannot ensure that the inflation process will last forever, due to their inherent
volatility and especially their increasing pension “maturity”, i.e. the situation by which the pensions
expenses exceed the contributions. This could be avoided “in a steadily growing economy, in which
pensionable employment is rising” (p. 69), but in contemporary advanced western economies,
which are not growing fast and where wage inflation is generally repressed, this is unlikely to
happen. This is further explained by Toporowski (2010), where he puts forward the idea that the
demand for equities by pension funds is inelastic, since it depends almost entirely on regulation
and the structure of respective institutions’ liabilities. Therefore, assuming an initial state of
equilibrium, there will be an increasing negative gap between demand and supply, so that firms
will progressively find themselves unable to refinance in the capital markets and will incur in “forced
indebtedness”.
The theory of capital market inflation has been conjectured to explain the dynamics of the
“core” capital markets. As the focus on the emergence of funded pension scheme shows, the
analysis is in fact tailored to the situation typical of Anglo-Saxon countries. Toporowski (2002,
pp. 77-81) however dedicates a section of his book to assess the inflation in “peripheral” capital
markets. These markets, he argues, “are largely dependent upon attracting international funds in
order to generate increases in securities prices and capital gains which will attract further funds”
(p. 77). The liquidity that sustains price-inflation in these markets is even more ephemeral than
in advanced markets, as a sudden change of mind of some large foreign investors can quickly bring
price deflation in that country.
However this was written in 2000, before the “new” patterns financial globalisation took place.
As said in the previous section, emerging markets are now important recipients of capital inflows in
their equity markets. Moreover over the same period, their overall financial position has definitely
improved, with many key emerging markets being in a structural current account surplus position
and almost of all them accumulating foreign exchange reserves to reduce both the likelihood and
the impacts of a financial crisis triggered by capital outflows (Prasad, 2011). Their position, in
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sum, appears to be much less fragile than it was only ten years ago.
It is a contention of this paper, that the theory of capital market inflation can be adapted and
extended to understand these new dynamics. In line with the original formulation of the theory,
emerging markets lack a suﬃciently large domestic institutional investor sector. The reasons un-
derlying this may diﬀer, depending on the country’s general welfare and institutional setting: in
lower income countries there are not enough wealthy people to create a functioning pension fund
sector, or, for other historical country-specific reasons, wealth is not traditionally accumulated in
equity assets, or, finally, countries may deliberately pursue a policy that promotes financial flows
from abroad because, for example, a recent crisis has seriously undermined the domestic capacity
to invest in the financial markets. This is arguably the situation of Brazil and South Korea, as
it will be mentioned in the following section. However, diﬀerently from the “ephemeral liquidity”
of “peripheral countries” described by Toporowski, foreign inflows in the period of financial glob-
alisation inflate equity markets in a way that is more similar to the capital market inflation of
“core” financial centres. Capital flows have been over the past decade more persistent and more
conspicuous than in the past so that market liquidity and price inflation in some emerging markets
look more like structural features of their capital markets. As a matter of fact, the size of the
Brazilian and South Korean stock markets, as it will be shown in the next section, has become
comparable to that of advanced countries stock markets. However, the conditions that give rise to
inflation or deflation of the capital markets remain closely related to foreign inflows. This means
that inflation and deflation may be possibly even more detached from “fundamentals”, because
financial troubles abroad may result in capital outflows leading to capital market deflation and the
consequent problems, as it was the case with the 2008 crisis.
This approach gives an important contribution to the assessment of financial globalisation as it
dissects the “black-box” of the impacts of capital flows on domestic asset markets. The theory of
capital market inflation provides in fact “an explanation of how the balance between income and
expenditure, that is, aggregate saving, and the institutional channels through which that saving
occurs, determines the value of assets in the financial markets” (Toporowski, 2005, pp. 9-10). In
the case of emerging markets, these institutional channels are the entrance of foreign investors,
following the liberalisation of capital markets and the related policies that foster international
financial flows.
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The next section explores some empirical evidence, by means of descriptive statistics, to see
whether the stylised facts of two key emerging equity markets, Brazil and South Korea, are con-
sistent with the theory of capital market inflation.
3 Brazil and South Korea in the era of financial globalisation
We are now going to look at the experience of Brazil and South Korea. These countries can be
considered good examples of “emerging markets”. Their economic size is considerable and has
increased in the past decade relative to the rest of the world. They are in fact considered key
“emerging markets” by many diﬀerent classifications. Brazil is considered, along with China, India
and Russia, a BRIC, an acronym elaborated by Goldman Sachs scholars (O’Neill, 2001; Wilson &
Purushothaman, 2003) to indicate countries that, thanks to their growing economic weight, will
increasingly dominate the world political and economic scenario. South Korea is a member of
the OECD, reflecting its more developed condition, but is frequently reported as major emerging
market, thanks to its elevated economic growth performance: the same scholars that conjectured
the BRIC concept (O’Neill et al., 2005) projected that South Korea will overtake many current
advanced countries in terms of GDP, and will have the third highest per-capita income by 2050.
Finally, and relevantly for this paper’s purpose, they are considered emerging markets by the
authorative MSCI classification, despite recent rumours of an upgrade for South Korea (MSCI,
2012).
Their financial history has also been relatively similar. Fig 4 and 5 show that the increase in
financial inflows started only in the mid 90’s. Both countries experienced, in this first phase, a
temporary but sudden decline in capital flows: South Korea was heavily hit by the East Asian
crisis in 1997-1998, and Brazil had its own currency crisis in 1999. However the prospects of
financial liberalisation were not hampered by these crises. To the contrary, the push for further
liberalisation came as part of the reforms that followed the crisis: both South Korea and Brazil
removed restrictions on foreign investment in the domestic securities in the aftermath of their
financial crises(Ahn, 2008; Carvalho & de Souza, 2009; Kalinowski & Cho, 2009; Kim & Yang,
2008; de Paula, 2010, chap 4 and 5). As a matter of fact, according to the Chinn & Ito (2008)
index of de-jure openness, in 1998 both countries were considerably less open than their developed
peers but have since then gradually opened their capital account (Table 1). The recent return of
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capital controls on the emerging markets policy agenda may account for Brazil’s index reduction
in 2010, and may indeed cause further reductions across many emerging markets once the index is
updated.
De-jure liberalisation came along with substantial de facto integration: as Figure 4 and Figure 5
show, capital restarted to flow into the countries in the first half of the 2000’s and spiked in 2007,
right before the global financial crisis. Furthermore, it appears that the 2008 crisis was a remarkable
but only temporary stop in the ongoing process of integration, as both countries at the end of 2010
had a level of external liabilities comparable or even higher than they had in 2007 (Figure 6 and
Figure 7). A noticeable fact about financial integration in the two countries is that, after the late
90’s crisis, it appears to be driven mostly by equity securities: the share of equity-like liabilities to
the total in both countries this has increased from about 30% to roughly 50%-60% in 2011.
In the same period, stock markets experienced a remarkable expansion. Between 2000 and
August 2008, equity price indexes have risen by more than 5 times in Brazil and roughly tripled
in South Korea (Figure 8). This performance is above the emerging markets average and greatly
above advanced markets. Unsurprisingly, over the same period we can see a dramatic increase
in stock market capitalisation, both in absolute terms and as a percentage to GDP (Table 2). In
2000, stock market capitalisation was about a third of GDP in South Korea and Brazil while the
average of high-income countries was over 114%. In 2007 the same figure for the three countries was
above 100%, eﬀectively converging to levels similar to high-income countries. This is particularly
noticeable, considering the good economic growth performance in the same period, and confirms
hat the stock market expansion was indeed remarkable.
A first link between the strong equity performance and financial globalisation is given by the
importance that foreigners had in the stock market over the same period. Figure 9 and Figure 10
show shareholding by foreign investors in the two countries. While the time frames are diﬀerent
the trends are roughly similar: in Brazil foreign holdings of stocks have constantly been rising
constantly reaching a peak of more than 40% in 2006, and then decreased to about 35% in 2007,
except a temporary fall in 2010; in South Korea, foreign holdings have strongly increased in the
early 2000’s, peaking at about 40% in 2004 and have since then slowly decreased to around 33%
in 2007, and, a part from a drop in 2008, have remained in that range since then. Therefore in
both countries foreign investors own about a third of the stock market value.
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In conclusion, the experience of Brazil and South Korea since the late 90’s is, generally speaking,
in line with the global trends. Their integration in the global financial markets has increased both
in policy terms, with the removal of several capital account restrictions, and in de facto expansion of
external positions and capital flows, especially in the second part of the 2000’s, briefly interrupted
by the 2008 crisis. Most of this integration has taken the form of increased equity liabilities,
both portfolio and FDI. Over the same period the countries seem to have experienced a process
of “financial development” in their equity markets, as prices and stock market capitalisation have
greatly increased, and foreign investors have grown to represent, as a category, about a third of
the stock market. This fact suggests that stock price inflation may be related to the behavior of
foreign investors.
Assessing whether the evidence may confirm this hypothesis is the purpose of next section.
4 Capital market inflation in Brazil and South Korea
This section assesses whether the empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical approach
outlined in section 3. This is done in four steps: the first subsection evaluates whether capital
market inflation has taken place in the analysed countries; the second subsection appraises whether
foreign investors have also benefited from equity appreciation; the third subsection considers the
evidence that foreign investors were key drivers of such inflation; the fourth subsection assesses
whether the behavior of foreign investors was coherent with the theory of capital market inflation.
4.1 Price inflation
The first step in this analysis is to assess the importance of equity price increase and its magnitude.
As shown in the previous section, the price indexes of the countries have risen considerably in the
past decade. While this, by definition, implies that stock prices have increased, it does not tell us
whether this increase has been determinant in the expansion of stock market capitalisation.
Stock market capitalisation is the sum of market capitalisation of all listed companies, that is
the total numbers of shares of a company times the price at which shares are exchanged. Therefore
stock market capitalisation can increase if either there is a new issuance of equity, or if the price of
existing shares rises. The “World federation of exchanges” publishes data of the amounts capital
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raised since 1995. We can therefore decompose the changes in stock market capitalisation in new
issued shares valuations changes.
Figure 11 shows the dynamics of Brazil’s stock market capitalisation, cumulative issuance of
shares1, and the diﬀerence between the two. In the case of Brazil, clearly, stock market capitalisa-
tion and cumulative equity issued before 2002 do not depart too much from one another, whereas
since 2002 the increase in stock market capitalisation greatly exceeds the increase in shares issued.
On the other hand, it is evident that price dynamics have been closely related to the increase in
stock market capitalisation over the whole period, and, after 2002 have clearly driven its dynamics
(Figure 12): over the whole 1995-2010 period, valuation changes account for about 78% of the stock
market capitalisation increase, a figure that increase to almost 86% if one considers the 1995-2007,
thus not considering the eﬀect of the crisis and the biggest share oﬀering in history by the giant
oil company Petrobras in 2010 (Economist, 2010).
The experience of South Korea is very similar. As we can see in Figure 13 and Figure 13, stock
market capitalisation have substantially departed from cumulated issuances since 2002, along with
the rise in the price index: over the 1995-2010 period valuation eﬀects account for 85% of total
changes in stock market capitalisation.
To check whether the valuation eﬀect series is a good proxy for equity price increase the yearly
increase in valuation eﬀects and MSCI price index is calculated taking 1995 as a base year. Table 3
shows that, in both countries, the MSCI index is less volatile but follows the same trend as the
valuation changes series. Calculating Pearson correlation coeﬃcients between the yearly variation
in valuation eﬀects and MSCI indexes gives a correlation of 0.97 for Brazil and 0.98 for South
Korea, both statistically significant. The valuation eﬀects series thus measures very well the eﬀect
of equity price increase.
Finally, Figure 15 shows that daily average stock trading has massively increased over the whole
period and, in particular, between 2004 and 2007, when the total value of trading increased by
2.5 times in South Korea and 4.5 times in Brazil. Trading activities has therefore increased in the
periods of maximum price expansion, which is consistent with the concept of a net excess inflow
circulating into the stock market as a source of price inflation2.
In sum, in Brazil and South Korea, stock market inflation has taken place over the past 15
years and is the main driving force in the expansion of the stock market.
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4.2 Foreign gains from capital market inflation
The performance of equity markets, as shown in the previous subsection, has been particularly
strong since 2002 vastly outpacing the net issuance. This subsection is concerned with quantifying
the impact of such a performance on foreign investors.
The most straightforward way of doing this is to decompose foreign equity liabilities by de-
ducting portfolio equity inflows from total equity liabilities, thus obtaining the change in foreign
liabilities due to valuations. Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the dynamics of portfolio flows and
foreign equity liabilities for Brazil and South Korea. It can clearly be seen that the impact of
valuation eﬀects has been the driving force of portfolio equity liabilities since 2002, as foreign eq-
uity liabilities depart substantially from cumulative inflows. However, valuation changes not only
reflect increases in equity prices, but, in the case of foreign investors, exchange rate dynamics3.
Therefore, using the MSCI index in local currency terms for both countries, it is possible to calcu-
late how would foreign equity liabilities increase if equity prices were the only driver. The result
is shown as “price-adjusted equity liabilities” in the figure. Foreign equity liabilities present more
volatility, generally in the same direction of equity price changes, suggesting that exchange rates
may amplify pro-cyclical tendencies, but overall there seems to be a close relation between the two
series. To further confirm this contention we calculate the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient between
yearly changes in foreign equity liabilities and MSCI price index in local currency: the results are
respectively 0.77 and 0.80 for South Korea and Brazil, both statistically significant (Table 4). All
this suggests the price changes are the most important drivers of equity liabilities.
There is therefore substantial evidence confirming that foreign investors have achieved capital
gains, and that this has been the driving force of the swelling of their equity assets in Brazil and
South Korea. Since the participation of foreigners in the domestic stock markets has not substan-
tially increased during the period of major equity price increase, it could be argued that foreign
investors have not been the driving force of such increase. Indeed, as Levy-Yeyati & Williams
(2011) argue, the whole idea of financial globalisation in emerging markets being a structural new
process may be ovestated: foreign investors could merely have accompanied the “more secular
process of financial deepening”, as the increase in foreign equity liabilities is more driven by an
increase in the stock market size, rather than an increase in foreign participation. However, the
fact that simple accounting ratios of foreign equity liabilities to stock market capitalisation have
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not significantly increased over the past few years does not demonstrate that foreign inflows have
been irrelevant for the dynamics of equity prices, it simply means that inflows have not increased
at a faster pace than equity prices. As suggested in section three, the equity price increase may
itself be the result of a disequilibrium of the capital market, that may be originated, or at least
supported, by capital inflows. In other words the sizeable, even if not growing in respect to the
capital market size, presence of foreign investors can generate the excess liquidity in the capital
markets which drives prices up, and therefore originate capital gains. The next subsection will
assess whether the evidence is coherent with this hypothesis.
4.3 Foreign investors driving equity prices
Has the stock market boom in Brazil and South Korea been driven by foreign investors? The
theory of capital market inflation, as presented in section 3, posits that the price of equity rise and
fall a result of a disequilibrium mechanism between the demand and the supply of equities: when
the demand for new issues is higher than new stock issued or of sales existing stock, the net excess
inflow of funds circulate driving stock prices up. To assess this theory we use two main indicators.
Firstly, we compare the stock market inflows with the net cumulated inflows by foreign investors
into the stock markets. Secondly we compare the issuance of shares by companies with the foreign
purchase of equity. Looking at both these indicators we can understand whether the stock market
price dynamics seem to move along with foreign inflows into the stock markets. Finally, we will
look at stock trading by foreign investors.
Figure 18 and Figure 19 show the cumulated net inflow of funds into the market by foreign in-
vestors. The two countries seem to have experienced remarkably similar trends: the net cumulated
inflows into the stock markets is positive and growing over the whole period, with the exception of
the dramatic sudden fall in 2008. A rather striking fact is the seemingly simultaneous movement
of the price index and the cumulated net inflows: foreign investors cumulated inflows and prices
move along similar lines, with the partial exception of South Korea in late 2007. This gives credit
to the idea that positive/negative cumulated foreign inflows into the stock markets give rise to
price inflation/deflation. It is important to notice that these flows are already net of foreign sub-
scription of newly raised capital, which may aﬀect the value of net inflows into the stock market:
for instance, foreign investors net balance into Bovespa in 2007 is moderately negative despite a
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big surplus in portfolio equity inflows, because of the massive participation of foreign investors
in public equity oﬀer - 75.6% of the total capital raised (Bovespa, 2007). A further comparison
between foreign supply of equity and demand might clarify this point.
Foreign inflows into the equity markets also look notable when compared to firms’ issuance:
Figure 20 shows the share of portfolio equity and total equity4 - that is including FDI equity
inflows - for Brazil and South Korea. In Brazil, the share of cumulated portfolio equity inflows to
the cumulated equity issuance has been rather constant in the decade before the crisis at around
55-60%. Including FDI equity inflows brings more variability to this ratio, which increased after
the crisis in 1999 to peak in 2005 at 330% and then steadily declined to 160% in 2010. In South
Korea this ratio was consistently higher at 80-90% over the period between the 1997 crisis and
2007, when it decreased dramatically due to a fall in capital inflows further depressed by the crisis
in 2008, and is now regaining share thanks to the massive capital inflows in 2009 and 2010. This
ratio increases to about 130%-140% over the same period including FDI equities. It therefore
appears that foreign investors have alone satisfied a great deal - more than half in Brazil, and
almost entirely in South Korea - of firms’ needs of equity financing, and more than covered them
if one includes direct investment in companies. This indicates that foreign investors impact in the
demand/supply equilibrium has been of high relevance over all the term.
Finally, Table 5 show that stock trading by foreign investors have been growing over time in
both countries. In Brazil foreign investors trading represent more than a third of total transac-
tions, while in South Korea this value had grown to about a quarter in 2006 and 2007, but have
decreased since the crisis to about 20%. South Korea results less dependent on foreign investors
activity, reflecting its more financially developed condition. Foreign investors remain however a
very important component of liquidity in both countries.
There is, in sum, enough evidence to support the idea that foreign investors have been key
players in the stock markets, in particular in driving or at least supporting, that excess liquidity
that, according to the theory of capital market inflation, is the ultimate determinant of stock prices
dynamics.
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4.4 Capital gains and dividends
Are earning perspectives the most important factors driving equity investment? This subsection
assesses whether income earnings or capital gain have played the most important part in delivering
returns to investors.
Figure 21 and Figure 22 show P/E ratios for the two countries. While the ratios show consider-
able volatility, especially in South Korea, the trend-lines shows the since 2000’s prices have grown
more than earnings on average. Prices have therefore risen more than the actual expansion of firms’
profit. P/E values reached maximum of about 17 in Brazil in late 2007 and 20 in South Korea
in 2010. Figure 23 and Figure 24 show the dividend yields. In Brazil, dividend yields have slowly
decreased overtime, particularly in 2006 and 2007, when the equity prices showed their maximum
increase. In South Korea, the dividend yields of companies traded in the KOSPI market - the main
stock market index - show considerable volatility, however the trend has been negative overtime.
Moreover such a yield is small in comparison to other countries: for instance, the dividend yield of
the London stock exchange was on average 3.1 over the 2000-2007 period according to the WFE,
while in South Korea it reached a maximum in 2002 at 2.84. Despite this trend of declining and/or
low dividends, foreign investors, as shown, have continued to invest in Brazilian and South Korean
equities.
In sum, the evidence seems to support the idea that capital gains through trading rather than
dividends are a driving force in determining the returns of foreign investors, and investors in
general.
5 Conclusion
Understanding the relation between financial integration and capital markets is of central impor-
tance in today’s financially interconnected world. In particular, the growing integration of emerging
equity markets into the global financial markets deserves attention, since, despite reducing the pos-
sibility of a “traditional” balance of payment crisis, it may create concerns about domestic financial
markets stability and international financial contagion. In fact, the important presence of foreign
investors into emerging financial markets has clearly been a channel of transmission of the global
financial crisis to those countries.
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This paper has engaged with this debate by linking the theory of capital market inflation to
financial globalisation. Emerging markets equity prices should be understood in relation to the
supply and demand of equity capital, and the disequilibrium that may arise between the two. Such
a disequilibrium in emerging markets is originated and sustained by foreign capital inflows.
The experience of Brazil and South Korea is consistent with such a framework. Over the
past decade both countries have become significantly more integrated and have experienced a
massive increase in the size and activity of their equity markets. The empirical evidence confirms
the relation between these two trends, as foreign investors did substantially contribute to create
the excess liquidity into the capital markets that resulted in a generalised rise in equity prices.
Moreover, the evidence also suggests that capital gains, rather than dividends income, represent
the most important part of investor returns.
In conclusion, the theory of capital market inflation represents a useful framework to assess
the performance of emerging equity markets in a situation of increasing international financial
integration. This paper has however only analysed the most evident aspect of capital market
inflation, the rise in equity prices. Assessing the broader macroeconomic impact of capital market
inflation in the context of emerging markets is an issue deserving further research. This could shed
light on the process of financial globalisation, and, hopefully, contribute positively to the debates
about how to manage it.
Notes
1This is the sum of initial public oﬀerings, and equity issuance by already listed companies.
2It could be argued that rising trading values simply reflect the higher equity prices. However, price between
2004 and 2007 increased by 2.5 in Brazil and roughly doubled in Korea, thus by less than the increase in trading
value.
3For example, for a US investor in Brazil, the appreciation of the Real against the dollar increase the Dollar
value of his asset.
4The use of IMF BOPS in US dollars instead of equity inflows data from the BMF&Bovespa and KRX is due
to ease of comparability, since the IMF publishes annual data in US dollars. Issuance data are only relative to the
listed companies. While this limits the scope of the data, the process of capital market inflation mainly refers to
listed companies.
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Countries group
“Emerging markets” comprise: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, India,
Indonesia, Korea (rep. of), Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation,
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey
‌
“Advanced countries” comprise: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
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Nomenclature
BMF&Bovespa Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias & Futuros de São Paulo
BOK Bank of Korea
FDI Foreign direct investments
IMF International monetary fund
IMF BOPS International monetary fund - Balance of payment statistics
KOSPI Korea Composite Stock Price Index
KRX Korean stock exchange
MSCI Morgan Stanley Capital International
P/E Price earnings ratio
WFE World federation of exchanges
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Figure 1: Global international assets and liabilities
Source: IMF BOPS
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Figure 2: World capital flows
Source: IMF BOPS
Note: Data for financial derivatives flows are omitted from the the total due to their incompleteness
both over time and across countries.
27
Figure 3: Emerging markets: external assets and liabilities
Source: Updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
and IMF BOPS
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Figure 4: Capital inflows: Brazil
Source: IMF BOPS
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Figure 5: Capital inflows: South Korea
Source: IMF BOPS
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Figure 6: Liabilities: Brazil
Source: IMF BOPS and (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007)
Note: IMF BOPS data are used when available
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Figure 7: Liabilities: South Korea
Source: IMF BOPS and (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007)
Note: IMF BOPS data are used when available
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Figure 8: Stock market index
Source: MSCI
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Figure 9: Foreign holdings: Brazil
Source: Financial Times
Note: Brazilian historical data on foreign ownership of the equity market are not publicly
available we used a graph published on a Financial Times article ( http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-
brics/2012/04/10/ems-in-1q12-start-with-a-bang-end-with-a-whimper/ ).
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Figure 10: Foreign holdings: South Korea
Source: KRX
Note: This the average of stocks held in both the main KOSPI and KOSDAQ, the Korean markets
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Figure 11: Stock market: Brazil
Source: WFE, BMF&Bovespa, MSCI, personal calculations
Note: All left scale data in BRL millions
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Figure 12: Stock market changes breakdown: Brazil
Source: personal calculations from BMF&Bovespa and WFE
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Figure 13: Stock market: South Korea
Source: WFE, BOK, MSCI, personal calculations
Note: All left scale data in KRW billions
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Figure 14: Stock market changes breakdown: South Korea
Source: WFE, BOK, MSCI, personal calculations
39
Figure 15: Stock trading
Source: BMF&Bovespa and BOK
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Figure 16: Foreign equity liabilities and prices: Brazil
Source: IMF, (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) and MSCI
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Figure 17: Foreign equity liabilities and prices: South Korea
Source: IMF, (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) and MSCI
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Figure 18: Inflows and prices: Brazil
Source: MSCI and BMF&Bovespa
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Figure 19: Inflows and prices: South Korea
Source: IMF BOPS and KRX
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Figure 20: Foreign flows and issuance
Source: IMF BOPS, KRX and Bmf&Bovespa
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Figure 21: P/E: Brazil
Source: Datastream
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Figure 22: P/E: South Korea
Source: Datastream
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Figure 23: Dividend yield: Brazil
Source: Datastream
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Figure 24: Dividend yield: South Korea
Source: KRX
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Table 1: Chin-Hito index of de-jure openness
Brazil Korea, Rep.
1998 0.1615 0.1615
1999 0.1615 0.1615
2000 0.1615 0.4057
2001 0.1615 0.4057
2002 0.4057 0.4057
2003 0.4057 0.4057
2004 0.4057 0.4057
2005 0.4671 0.4057
2006 0.5285 0.4057
2007 0.5285 0.4057
2008 0.5285 0.4671
2009 0.5285 0.5285
2010 0.4671 0.5899
Source: (Chinn & Ito, 2008)
Note: the index is normalised between 0 and 1
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Table 2: GDP and Stock market capitalisation
‌
Brazil Korea, Rep. High
income
GDP growth rate Stock
market
cap USD
millions
Stock
market
cap % of
GDP
GDP growth rate Stock
market
cap USD
millions
Stock
market
cap % of
GDP
Stock
market
cap % of
GDP
1991 1.51 42,800 10.51 9.39 96,400 31.28 56.48
1995 4.42 147,636 19.20 9.17 181,955 35.19 66.49
2000 4.31 226,152 35.08 8.49 171,587 32.17 114.85
2005 3.16 474,647 53.80 3.96 718,180 85.01 108.76
2006 3.96 711,100 65.30 5.18 835,188 87.75 120.91
2007 6.09 1,370,377 100.32 5.11 1,123,633 107.09 121.02
2008 5.17 589,384 35.66 2.30 494,631 53.11 64.66
2009 (0.33) 1,167,335 71.98 0.32 836,462 100.29 88.24
2010 7.53 1,545,566 72.12 6.32 1,089,217 107.32 95.98
2011 2.73 1,228,969 49.62 3.63 994,302 89.08 74.98
Source: World Bank
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Table 3: Valuation changes and price index
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Table 4: Foreign equity liabilities and price index: yearly changes and correlation
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Table 5: Stock trading by foreigners/Total trading
Brazil South Korea
1995 0.264 0.049
1996 0.286 0.060
1997 0.259 0.067
1998 0.251 0.075
1999 0.223 0.052
2000 0.220 0.092
2001 0.251 0.105
2002 0.260 0.115
2003 0.241 0.155
2004 0.273 0.225
2005 0.328 0.205
2006 0.355 0.259
2007 0.345 0.245
2008 0.355 0.254
2009 0.342 0.170
2010 0.296 0.202
2011 0.347 0.183
Source: BMF&Bovepsa and BOK
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